

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 00302

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, GE, GW, WB, UR, RO
SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY MINISTER OF STATE WISCHNEWSKI ON
FRG-GDR RELATIONS; BERLIN; EASTERN EUROPE
AND SOVIET UNION

REFS: A) BONN 002266; B) BONN 00176; C) BONN 20897
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1. BEGIN SUMMARY: WISCHNEWSKI'S VIEWS ON GDR OPPOSITION
MANIFESTO WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE WE HAVE HEARD FROM
FOREIGN OFFICE; HE BELIEVES DOCUMENT IS PROBABLY
AUTHENTIC, ALTHOUGH ORIGINATING FROM VERY SMALL
GROUP OF PERSONS. HE CONFIRMED THAT, BASED ON HIS
CONVERSATIONS IN BONN WITH GDR REPRESENTATIVE KOHL,
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GDR OBVIOUSLY WISHES TO PLAY DOWN IMPACT OF MANIFESTO.
WISCHNEWSKI SAID FRG AUTHORITIES ALSO WISHED TO
MINIMIZE ADVERSE IMPACT. WISCHNEWSKI HOPES FOR
FURTHER PROGRESS IN 1978 IN FRG-GDR NEGOTIATIONS,
ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVES SOVIETS HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS
ON THIS SCORE. WISCHNEWSKI IS PLANNING A PERSONAL
VISIT TO GDR DURING FIRST HALF OF 1978. SCHMIDT-

HONECKER MEETING IS PROBABLE SOMETIME DURING YEAR, BUT NO FIRM PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE AND SCHMIDT WILL INSIST THAT PROGRESS IN HUMANITARIAN FIELD MUST ACCOMPANY SUCH A MEETING. WISCHNEWSKI EXPECTS BREZHNEV TO VISIT FRG IN FIRST HALF OF 1978. ON BERLIN, WISCHNEWSKI STRONGLY OPPOSES DEMONSTRATIVE ACTS WHICH COULD RESULT IN SOVIET OBJECTIONS. WISCHNEWSKI SAID SCHMIDT WAS RELUCTANT TO VISIT ROMANIA AND EXPECTS LITTLE TO RESULT FROM VISIT. WISCHNEWSKI WAS EMPHATIC IN DENYING THAT SCHMIDT IS ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT FRG ATTENTION TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE AND AWAY FROM SOVIET UNION. END SUMMARY.

2. MANIFESTO: AT LUNCH WITH ME JANUARY 5, MINISTER OF STATE WISCHNEWSKI EXPRESSED VIEW THAT GDR OPPOSITION MANIFESTO IS PROBABLY ATUTHEENTIC, ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVES IT COMES FROM VERY SMALL GROUP OF PERSONS IN GDR. WHILE OPPOSITION IS WIDE-SPREAD IN GDR, IT IS NOT ORGANIZED AND HE DID NOT FEEL THAT TOP PARTY PEOPLE WERE INVOLVED. WISCHNEWSKI SAID CATEGORICALLY MANIFESTO WAS NOT PRODUCED BY FRG INTELLIGENCE CIRCLES AND HE DOUBTED THAT IT HAD BEEN LAUNCHED BY HARDLINERS IN GDR IN EFFORT TO WEAKEN HONECKER. IT WAS POSSIBLE, HE FELT, THAT "MAOIST GROUP" IN GDR MIGHT HAVE INFLUENCED MANIFESTO, AND HE NOTED THAT MAOIST-LEANING KPD IN FRG HAD GIVEN SECRET

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WARM SUPPORT TO MANIFESTO.

3. WISCHNEWSKI SAID GDR REPRESENTATIVE KOHL HAD BEEN QUITE MODERATE IN PROTESTING MANIFESTO TO HIM AND HAD GIVEN CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT GDR HOPES TO PLAY DOWN THE ISSUE. THIS HAD ALSO BEEN IMPRESSION RECEIVED FROM STYLE OF PROTEST MADE IN EAST BERLIN TO ZDF REPRESENTATIVE. WISCHNEWSKI SAID THAT, FOR ITS PART, FRG LIKEWISE DID NOT WISH TO EXAGGERATE THE INCIDENT.

4. ON QUESTION OF GDR REFUSAL OF ACCREDITATION TO NEW SPIEGEL MAN IN EAST BERLIN, WISCHNEWSKI SAID SPIEGEL IS SENDING LETTER TO GDR WHICH, WHILE NOT GIVING UP ANYTHING IN SUBSTANCE, WILL BE COUCHED IN CONCILIATORY LANGUAGE. WISCHNEWSKI WAS HOPEFUL THAT ACCREDITATION PROBLEM COULD BE WORKED OUT IN DUE COURSE.

5. WISCHNEWSKI SAID THAT KOHL HAD PRESSED FOR BAN ON PUBLICATION OF FINAL CHAPTER OF MANIFESTO IN SPIEGEL NEXT WEEK, BUT, OF COURSE, THIS WOULD NOT BE

POSSIBLE. WISCHNEWSKI NOTED THAT VIEWS ABOUT FREEDOM OF PRESS IN GDR AND FRG ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED AND THERE IS NO WAY TO RECONCILE THEM.

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6. FRG-GDR NEGOTIATIONS: WISCHNEWSKI DID NOT EXPECT THAT THE MANIFESTO AFFAIR WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IN HIS RECENT TALK WITH GDR REPRESENTATIVE KOHL, BOTH HAD AGREED THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE LAST YEAR AND THAT FURTHER PROGRESS WAS TO BE EXPECTED IN 1978. WISCHNEWSKI ANTICIPATES THAT AGREEMENT PROBABLY WILL BE REACHED ON CONSTRUCTION OF AN AUTOBAHN FROM BERLIN TO HAMBURG ON THE NORTHERN ROUTE (ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME INDICATION FROM GDR SOURCES THAT SOVIETS HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROJECT), ON IMPROVING POST AND TELEPHONE SERVICES AND POSSIBLY ON THE

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REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION OF CANALS LINKING BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY. ON LATTER PROJECT, WISCHNEWSKI COMMENTED THAT ANY AGREEMENT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE LONG TERM - PROBABLY 10 YEARS - AND THIS WAS SOMETHING HE FAVORED, SINCE IT COULD SERVE AS A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON GDR BEHAVIOR. WISCHNEWSKI ALSO FEELS THAT THE GDR IS DEMONSTRATING INCREASED RESTRAINT CONCERNING BORDER INCIDENTS AND HE HOPES AND EXPECTS THAT IN THE FUTURE THERE WILL BE FEWER PERSONS SHOT WHILE TRYING TO ESCAPE FROM THE GDR INTO THE FRG.

7. WISCHNEWSKI CONFIRMED THAT THE FRG IS AWARE OF REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT THEIR LACK OF INFORMATION CONCERNING FRG-GDR RELATIONS. ALSO, HE HAS HEARD THAT SOVIETS ARE CRITICAL OF INSISTENT GDR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN HARD CURRENCY BY ALMOST ANY MEANS. HE NOTED THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR FALIN HAD COMPLAINED DIRECTLY TO HIM ABOUT HIS LACK OF INFORMATION CONCERNING DETAILS ON FRG-GDR NEGOTIATIONS; HOWEVER, WISCHNEWSKI HAD MADE IT CLEAR IN RESPONSE THAT FRG DID NOT FEEL IT WAS NECESSARY OR APPROPRIATE TO BRIEF THE SOVIET UNION ON THE TALKS.

8. SCHMIDT-HONECKER MEETING: WISCHNEWSKI SAID SCHMIDT AGREES IN PRINCIPLE THAT SUCH A MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE, BUT HE WILL INSIST THAT THIS OCCUR ONLY IF CLEAR RESULTS ARE FORTHCOMING IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD. FOR EXAMPLE, THIS MIGHT BE A REDUCTION OF FIVE YEARS ON AGE LIMITS ON PERSONS VISITING WEST GERMANY - AN ACTION WHICH WISCHNEWSKI FEELS THE GDR COULD TAKE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. WISCHNEWSKI MENTIONED THAT THE SUGGESTION HAD BEEN MADE THAT THE MEETING MIGHT TAKE PLACE AT THE UN IN
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NEW YORK IN THE FALL, BUT IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT HONECKER WOULD BE UNABLE TO MEET SCHMIDT THERE, SINCE BREZHNEV HAS NOT YET VISITED THE UN.

9. WISCHNEWSKI STRESSED THAT NO FIRM PLANS WERE SET FOR A SCHMIDT-HONECKER MEETING, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT ONE PROBABLY WOULD BE ARRANGED FOR LATE SUMMER OR FALL. HE DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THIS MEETING AND THE TIMING OF A BREZHNEV VISIT, ALTHOUGH

IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS SUBSEQUENT REMARKS THAT HE EXPECTS BREZHNEV TO VISIT THE FRG BEFORE A SCHMIDT-HONECKER VISIT OCCURS.

10. WISCHNEWSKI TO GDR: WISCHNEWSKI SAID HE IS PLANNING TO MAKE HIS OWN VISIT TO THE GDR SOMETIME DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1978. HE WANTS TO VISIT SOME PLACE OUTSIDE OF EAST BERLIN - PROBABLY WEIMAR - AND THEN WOULD CALL AT THE FRG PERMANENT REPRESENTATION IN EAST BERLIN AND ON OFFICIALS OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT. WISCHNEWSKI NOTED THAT WHILE HIS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY EMBRACES THE GDR, HE HAS NEVER VISITED THERE AND HE THINKS HE SHOULD DO SO SOON. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH WISCHNEWSKI DID NOT MENTION IT, SUCH A VISIT COULD BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF PREPARATION FOR A SUBSEQUENT SCHMIDT VISIT TO THE GDR).

11. KOHL REPLACEMENT: WISCHNEWSKI SAID GDR REPRESENTATIVE KOHL WOULD BE LEAVING BONN NEXT SUMMER, MOST PROBABLY TO TAKE A POSITION AS ONE OF THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE. HIS DEPARTURE, OF COURSE, COULD BE DELAYED IF A SCHMIDT-HONECKER MEETING SEEMS IMMINENT. WISCHNEWSKI HAS HEARD THAT NIER IS SCHEDULED TO REPLACE KOHL IN BONN.

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12. BERLIN: WISCHNEWSKI EXPRESSED HIMSELF STRONGLY AGAINST DEMONSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN WHICH BRING LITTLE BENEFIT TO THE CITY BUT HAVE THE

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EFFECT OF STIRRING UP THE SOVIETS. HE SAID HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY IN BERLIN AND THAT HE HAS ACTIVELY DISCOURAGED SIMILAR MOVES (ONE HE MENTIONED WAS AN IDEA FOR ESTABLISHING A BRANCH OF THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BERLIN). HE REFERRED TO MEETINGS OF LANTAG FRAKTIONS IN WEST BERLIN AND SAID THAT, WHILE THERE WAS LITTLE ONE COULD DO ABOUT SUCH MEETINGS, HE THOUGHT IT WAS WHOLLY UNNECESSARY FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE FRAKTIONS TO TRY AND MEET IN A BODY IN THE OFFICE OF THE FRG PERMANENT REPRESENTATION IN EAST BERLIN AND THAT HE WOULD COUNSEL STRONGLY AGAINST THIS. WISCHNEWSKI
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WAS WARM IN HIS PRAISE OF GOVERNING MAYOR STOBBE AND HIS MODERATE, LEVEL-HEADED APPROACH.

13. WISCHNEWSKI SEES TWO TRIGGER POINTS AHEAD WHICH COULD STIMULATE SOVIET CONCERN: STOBBE'S ASSUMPTION OF THE BUNDESRAT PRESIDENCY TOWARD THE END OF 1978 AND ELECTIONS TO THE EC PARLIAMENT. HE DOUBTS THAT THE SOVIETS WISH TO SEE TROUBLE ABOUT WEST BERLIN OF A SERIOUS KIND AND HE THINKS THAT THESE TWO SITUATIONS CAN BE HANDLED IN A WAY TO MINIMIZE DANGERS OF A SOVIET OVERREACTION, BUT HE FEELS THINGS MUST BE WATCHED CAREFULLY. WISCHNEWSKI STRESSED HIS AWARENESS OF ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT BERLIN, IN PARTICULAR MOVES BY SOME FRG AGENCIES WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS GOING TOO FAR IN THE DIRECTION OF

FRG COMPETENCE IN THE CITY.

14. BREZHNEV VISIT: WISCHNEWSKI BELIEVES THAT BREZHNEV WILL VISIT THE FRG, PROBABLY IN LATE FEBRUARY OR MARCH. THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE PREPARING THE GROUND FOR SUCH A VISIT, AND WISCHNEWSKI CITED BREZHNEV'S REMARKS IN HIS PRAVDA INTERVIEW AS WELL AS THE PUBLICATION IN THE LATEST ISSUE OF NEW TIMES OF AN INTERVIEW WITH WISCHNEWSKI HIMSELF. THIS INTERVIEW WAS GIVEN SEVERAL MONTHS AGO AND HE BELIEVES ITS PUBLICATION AT THIS TIME IS SIGNIFICANT.

15. WISCHNEWSKI ACKNOWLEDGED A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR AND HIMSELF ABOUT THE THREE OUTSTANDING TREATIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH ARE HELD UP OVER THE BERLIN CLAUSE. WHILE SCHMIDT FEELS THAT THE FRG CAN LIVE WITHOUT THESE TREATIES AND THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE THEM IN CONNECTION
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WITH A BREZHNEV VISIT, WISCHNEWSKI FEELS THAT THE VISIT WOULD SEEM MEANINGLESS WITHOUT THEM AND THAT A COMPROMISE SOLUTION PERMITTING THEIR SIGNATURE CAN ADND MUST BE REACHED.

16. SCHMIDT VISIT TO ROMANIA AND FRG POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE: WISCHNEWSKI SAID SCHMIDT WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO GO TO ROMANIA AND ONLY DID SO BECAUSE HE HAD POSTPONED A VISIT SEVERAL TIMES AND FELT HE COULD NOT DO SO AGAIN. WISCHNEWSKI SAID THAT ROMANIA'S DEMANDS SEEMED EXCESSIVE AND IMPOSSIBLE OF FULFILLMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAD ORIGINALLY INSISTED ON SOME KIND OF "FINANCIAL HONORARIUM" FOR AGREEING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THEY ARE STILL TALKING ABOUT THIS. SUCH A PAYMENT, OF COURSE, IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. ROMANIA ALSO WISHES TO RECEIVE

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A LARGE AMOUNT OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FROM THE
FRG, CITING THE AMOUNTS GRANTED TO POLAND AND
YUGOSLAVIA. HOWEVER, WISCHNEWSKI SAID, THE FRG FEELS
NO MORAL OBLIGATION TOWARD ROMANIA - THE LAST
EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLY OF NAZI GERMANY - IN CONTRAST
TO ATTITUDES TOWARD POLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA, AND
THERE IS NO DISPOSITION TO GRANT ROMANIA LARGE
DEVELOPMENT FUNDS. LASTLY, ROMANIA SEEMS TO WANT
A "GIFT" OF THE NEW FOKKER AIRPLANES IT HAS
CONTRACTED TO PURCHASE; THIS, TOO, IS NOT FEASIBLE.

17. WISCHNEWSKI WAS EMPHATIC IN DENYING THAT THE
CHANCELLOR'S VISITS TO POLAND AND ROMANIA REPRESENTED
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A SHIFT OF FRG ATTENTION TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE AND
A DOWN-PLAYING OF THE SOVIET UNION. (THIS HAS BEEN
RUMORED IN SOME CIRCLES IN BONN, SEE REFTEL C). HE
SAID THE CHANCELLOR IS REALISTIC ABOUT POWER
RELATIONSHIPS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ABOUT THE
PRIORITIES WHICH THE FRG MUST FOLLOW; THEREFORE,
HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP WORKING
FOR IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FRG AND
THE USSR, DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED.
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